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INTRODUCTION
Sovereign entities, such as states, foreign countries, and Native American
tribes, are able to assert, as a defense in civil suits, sovereign immunity,
stemming from a traditional understanding that sovereign entities should not
be sued by citizens and other private entities, foreign or domestic.1 However,
the law places limitations on when sovereign immunity may be asserted,2
when it can be abrogated,3 and when it has been waived.4 In United States
sovereign immunity doctrine, various types of entities are treated differently,
stemming in part from their foundations in different forms of the law; state
sovereign immunity stems from the Constitution,5 while tribal sovereign
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J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2016, Cornell University. I
would like to give special thanks to Professor R. Polk Wagner for his guidance through the process
of writing this Comment and to Professor Catherine T. Struve for her helpful resources on sovereign
immunity during my research. I would also like to thank the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
Constitutional Law Editors and Board for their hard work on this Comment.
See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1889, 1896–99 (1983) (explaining the history of sovereign immunity in the United States,
which stemmed from British conceptions of sovereign immunity of the monarch).
See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (“That a state cannot be sued by a citizen of
another State, or of a foreign state, on the mere ground that the case is one arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, is clearly established by the decisions of this court . . . .”).
See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635–36
(1999) (holding that Congress could only abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
See, e.g., Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (“[W]here a state voluntarily
becomes a party to a cause, and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound
thereby, and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the
Eleventh Amendment.”).
See U.S. CONST. amend XI (“The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); Hans, 134 U.S. at 10–
11, 15–16 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment extended sovereign immunity to include suits
brought by citizens of a state against that state).
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immunity has its foundations in international law and the early relationship
of British colonists with Indian tribes.6
As the United States has grown and developed, so have sovereign
immunity doctrines. The clearest example of this co-evolution is
administrative adjudication. Though the Constitution, the Founders, and
early Supreme Court Justices could not have foreseen the growth of the
administrative state and the adjudications that occur in administrative
agencies,7 the federal courts and agencies have had to grapple with sovereign
immunity, as both states and tribes have sought to assert their immunity in
agency adjudication.8 While the Supreme Court has provided a rule for
when state sovereign immunity should apply in administrative
adjudications,9 it has not yet done so for tribal sovereign immunity, leading
to inconsistencies across courts and agencies as to whether tribal immunity
should apply.
This inconsistency is particularly visible in the Patent and Trademark
Office (the “PTO”) and its decision-making body, the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board (the “PTAB” or the “Board”). Over the course of a year, the
PTAB decided both state and tribal sovereign immunity cases, using
conflicting reasoning between the cases.10 This Comment will examine the
doctrines of tribal and sovereign immunity and the way that they have been
applied at the PTO in order to determine whether tribal sovereign immunity
should be applied, as state sovereign immunity is, in administrative
adjudications.
Part I will compare the doctrines of state and tribal sovereign immunity
in the federal courts to understand their foundations and basic principles. It
will also explore immunity in administrative adjudications, where the
Supreme Court has provided guidance only for state sovereign immunity.
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See Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 139–40 (2004)
(stating that the United States continued a policy of negotiating treaties with Indian tribes, treating
the tribes as sovereign entities).
See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 755 (2002) (“The Framers, who
envisioned a limited Federal Government, could not have anticipated the vast growth of the
administrative state.”).
See, e.g., id. at 749 (explaining that South Carolina asserted its state sovereign immunity, filing a
motion to dismiss a suit against it in a Federal Maritime Commission proceeding); Mylan Pharms.
Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-00127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Feb.
23, 2018) (per curiam) (explaining that the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe sought to assert its sovereign
immunity in a proceeding at the Patent and Trademark Office).
See Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 756 (holding that state sovereign immunity extends to
administrative adjudication when those proceedings are the “type of proceedings from which the
Framers would have thought the States possessed immunity”).
Compare Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found. Inc., No. IPR2016-01274, 2017 WL
4015009, at *17 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017) (holding that state sovereign immunity was applicable in
a proceeding in front of the PTO), with Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *15 (holding that tribal
sovereign immunity could not be asserted as a defense in a proceeding in front of the PTO), aff’d,
896 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Part II will provide a brief overview of patent remedies and the adjudicatory
proceedings of the PTO. Part III will examine cases where the federal courts
have applied principles of immunity to patent cases as well as the PTAB’s
decisions applying sovereign immunity and examine inconsistencies in those
decisions. Part IV will consider the policy implications for these doctrines
and policy reasons for and against application of tribal immunity in
administrative adjudications.
I. DOCTRINES OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity doctrines have been well researched and frequently
discussed. This Part will provide a brief history of the two doctrines at issue,
state and tribal sovereign immunity, and a discussion of the relevant law for
the doctrines.
A. State Immunity
State sovereignty and immunity was recognized before the Constitutional
Convention.11 State sovereignty was debated prior to the ratification of the
Constitution as well, as seen in Alexander Hamilton’s statement that “[i]t is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent.”12 Given this view of sovereignty, it is
unsurprising that the Constitution contains no provisions about state
sovereign immunity, though the Constitution contemplated a possibility of
such immunity,13 as Article III grants the federal courts jurisdiction over
“[c]ontroversies between two or more States.”14 Prior to the ratification of
the Eleventh Amendment, the Court considered the question of state
immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia.15 The Court, with each Justice writing a
separate opinion, concluded that a State was not immune from suit, with
three Justices relying on the Constitution’s grant of judicial power in Article
III to support their opinions.16 The Court’s opinion resulted in an adverse
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See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (“[T]he States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental
aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and
which they retain today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
Amendments.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states . . . .”).
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 905 (7th ed. 2015).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793).
Id. at 450 (opinion of Blair, J.) (“What then do we find there [in the Constitution] requiring the
submission of individual States to the judicial authority of the United States? This is expressly
extended, among other things, to controversies between a State and citizens of another State.”); id.
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reaction, leading to the Eleventh Amendment.17
The Eleventh Amendment provides that a suit in equity cannot be
commenced against one of the states by citizens of another state or by citizens
of a foreign state.18 Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the amendment
narrowly.19 However, the Supreme Court broadened its interpretation at
the end of the nineteenth century in Hans v. Louisiana.20 In Hans, the Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment extended to include suits brought against
one of the states by citizens of that state, despite the amendment’s failure to
include such language.21 Since Hans, the Court has justified state sovereign
immunity through theories of federalism and state dignity. The states
entered the “federal system with their sovereignty intact,”22 rather than
“consent[ing] to become mere appendages of the Federal Government.”23
Thus, state sovereign immunity is a balance between state and federal rights.
The Court has also stated that one of the purposes of “state sovereign
immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as
sovereign entities.”24
After Hans, the Court has primarily focused on two exceptions to state
sovereign immunity: the states’ waiver of their immunity and congressional
ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity.25 Both exceptions present
narrow circumstances in which a state may not claim immunity. For a state
to waive immunity, the Court has required express language,26 though a state
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at 466–67 (opinion of Cushing, J.) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); id. at 479 (opinion of Jay, J.)
(also citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall
extend to . . . Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another
State . . . .”).
FALLON, supra note 13, at 906.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
See e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 857–58 (1824) (holding that
for the Eleventh Amendment to apply, a state must be a named as a party in the suit); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 410, 412 (1821) (concluding that Virginia could not assert
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment because a petition for a writ of error was not a suit
because a writ of error acts only on the record, not the parties, and that even if it were a suit, the
Eleventh Amendment could not apply because the case was between a state and a citizen of the
same state).
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Id. at 10–11, 16. Hans argued that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar his suit against Louisiana
because he was a citizen of Louisiana and the amendment only prevented suits brought by citizens
of a different state or of a foreign state. Id. at 10. The Court held that to allow suits between a state
and its own citizens would be inconsistent with the ultimate sovereignty the amendment created. Id.
at 11. As a result, the Court concluded that a state could not be sued without its consent. Id. at 16.
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002).
Id. at 760 (citing In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
Tejas N. Narechania, Note, An Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical Analysis of the “Sword” of State Sovereign
Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1574, 1579–80 (2010).
Id. at 1580 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)).
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may also waive its immunity through litigation conduct by voluntarily
becoming party to a suit.27 In Lapides v. Board of Regents of University System of
Georgia,28 the Court considered when litigation conduct would amount to
waiver of a state’s immunity. The Court held that Georgia voluntarily
agreed to remove its case to federal court, and therefore voluntarily invoked
the federal court’s jurisdiction in a way that was analogous to a state
voluntarily appearing in court, as in Clark v. Barnard and Gunter v. Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Co.29 Thus, any time that a state voluntarily invokes the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, it has waived its immunity, regardless of the
state’s motives for doing so.30
The Court has similarly required an unmistakably clear, express
statement of Congress’s statutory intention to abrogate state sovereign
immunity for a state to be subject to a federal suit.31 The Court has also
placed additional limits on abrogation. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Court
considered the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, passed by Congress under
the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution.32 The Act gave the district
courts jurisdiction over causes of action arising from a state’s failure to
negotiate with an Indian tribe in good faith.33 The Court held that although
the Constitution provided Congress complete law-making authority in
certain areas, the Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from
authorizing suits between private parties and unconsenting states.34
Congress’s Article I powers could not be used to circumvent the restrictions
the Eleventh Amendment placed on Article III judicial powers.35 In so
holding, the Court noted that certain provisions of the Constitution would
allow for abrogation, in particular the Fourteenth Amendment because it
contains prohibitions that were expressly directed at the states and gave
Congress the power to enforce those provisions.36
Similar to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at issue in Seminole Tribe,
Congress amended the patent laws in 1992 to expressly abrogate state
27
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Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (“[W]here a State voluntarily
becomes a party to a cause and submits its rights for judicial determination, it will be bound thereby
and cannot escape the result of its own voluntary act by invoking the prohibitions of the Eleventh
Amendment.”); Narechania, supra note 25, at 1580–81.
535 U.S. 613 (2002).
Lapides, 535 U.S. at 619–20 (citing Gunter, 200 U.S. at 284; Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447
(1883)).
Id. at 620–21.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55–57 (1996).
Id. at 47 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, §11, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as
25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(7)(A)-(B) (2012)).
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72–73.
Id.
Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 (1976)).
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sovereign immunity from patent infringement claims in the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act.37 In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, the Court applied the framework
from Seminole Tribe, determining first whether Congress clearly expressed its
intent to abrogate state immunity and second whether abrogation was a valid
exercise of power.38 Though the Court found that Congress had clearly
expressed its intent to abrogate immunity, the Court maintained that Article
I did not grant Congress authority to abrogate immunity and that such
authority would have to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment.39 For the
Fourteenth Amendment to support a valid abrogation, Congress was
required to identify a transgression of the Fourteenth Amendment and then
narrowly tailor legislation to that transgression, as asserted in City of Boerne v.
Flores.40 The Court found that the Patent Remedy Act could not be sustained
under the Fourteenth Amendment because there was an insufficient
legislative history to support a finding that Congress was attempting to
remedy a Fourteenth Amendment violation through the Act.41
The Court has also extended the doctrine of state sovereign immunity to
administrative adjudication proceedings. The Court first considered the
question of whether state sovereign immunity should apply in administrative
adjudications in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports
Authority.42 While the Court recognized that the Eleventh Amendment did
not specifically grant immunity from adjudicative proceedings, it recognized
that their past precedents demonstrate that the Eleventh Amendment did not
define the full scope of state sovereign immunity.43 Therefore, to determine
whether state sovereign immunity should apply in an administrative
adjudication, the Court looked at the administrative hearing and whether it
was the type of proceeding in which the Framers would have thought state
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39

40
41
42
43

Brandon White, Comment, Protecting Patent Owners from Infringement By the States: Will the Intellectual
Property Rights Restoration Act of 1999 Finally Satisfy the Court?, 35 AKRON L. REV. 531, 543 (2002); see
also Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106 Stat.
4230, § 2 (1992) (codified as amended in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012)) (stating that any state is subject to
the provisions of Title 35 to the same extent as a nongovernmental entity).
527 U.S. 627, 635 (1999).
Id. at 635–36. Congress attempted to justify the Patent Remedy Act under the Intellectual Property
Clause, Commerce Clause, and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, though the Court held
that only the Fourteenth Amendment could support such an abrogation of state immunity. Id.
(citing U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .”);
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5 (granting Congress power to enforce the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment)).
Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639–40 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 525 (1997)).
Id. at 640, 642.
535 U.S. 743 (2002).
Id. at 753.
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sovereign immunity should apply.44
The Court concluded that
administrative hearings at the Federal Maritime Commission bore “a
remarkably strong resemblance to civil litigation in federal courts,” and, thus,
were the type of proceedings in which state sovereign immunity should
apply.45
B. Tribal Immunity
While the Supreme Court has yet to make a determination of whether
tribal sovereign immunity should apply in administrative adjudications, it is
important to understand the state of tribal immunity doctrine that will inform
the issue. Unlike state sovereign immunity and modern foreign sovereign
immunity, tribal sovereign immunity is not a constitutional or statutory grant
but is “recognized as a matter of federal common law.”46 The doctrine of
tribal sovereign immunity, however, does share common origins with state
and foreign sovereign immunities.47 In part, this common origin is a function
of the United States’ early interactions with tribes, both before and after
winning independence from Great Britain.48 The Constitution grants
Congress the authority to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”49 The United States
continued to make treaties with the Indian tribes, with Congress itself having
minimal involvement with the tribes, other than legislation for the purposes
of enforcing treaties.50
In an early set of cases, the Marshall Court considered the status of Indian
tribes as sovereign entities.51 The Court distinguished Indian tribes from
both the states and foreign nations in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,52 stating that
the tribes were more like “domestic dependent nations,” which still
maintained sovereignty, as seen in the way that tribes managed their own
affairs and governed themselves.53 A year later in Worcester v. Georgia,54 the
44
45
46
47
48

49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 756.
Id. at 744, 759.
Catherine T. Struve, Sovereign Litigants: Native American Nations in Court, 55 VILL. L. REV. 929, 949
(2010).
William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1623
(2013).
Id. at 1623–24. European countries, including Great Britain, treated Indian tribes as independent
sovereign states within the borders of their colonies. Id. at 1623. After declaring independence
from Great Britain, the United States continued to enter into treaties with Indian tribes under the
Articles of Confederation. Id. at 1624.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Wood, supra note 47, at 1625.
Struve, supra note 6, at 140.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
Id. at 16–17.
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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Court reaffirmed the sovereignty of the Indian tribes, asserting that the tribes
retained their right to self-government and only relied on the United States
for protection.55 The Court began to recognize the sovereign immunity of
Indian tribes in Parks v. Ross,56 as the Court asserted that the Cherokees were
a foreign, independent nation, and that the federal government had not
granted the federal courts the power to decide matters relating to the
Cherokee as a nation.57 With the foundations of tribal sovereign immunity
established, the Court was more explicit about tribal immunity in 1919,
though the Court did not fully discuss the doctrine at that time.58 However,
the Court later established that Indian tribes would be immune from suit
absent a congressional grant of authority to the federal courts.59 In doing so,
the Court based its decision on public policy that both the United States and
its “dependent sovereigns” should be exempt from suits that they did not
consent to.60 The Court has additionally held that abrogation of tribal
sovereign immunity, like abrogation of state sovereign immunity, requires an
unequivocal expression of that purpose, though the authority to abrogate is
not limited in the same ways that it is for state sovereign immunity.61
The Supreme Court has continued to reaffirm a broad tribal sovereign
immunity doctrine.62 The Court’s recent decisions, however, have expressed
some uneasiness with the broad scope of tribal sovereign immunity, most
notably in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies.63 Despite
upholding its broad scope, the Court was critical of tribal sovereign
immunity, claiming that it developed by accident, arguing that the rationale
behind its broad scope no longer exists, but ultimately deferring to Congress
to limit the scope.64 In particular, the Court drew a parallel between tribal
55

56
57
58

59
60
61
62

63
64

Id. at 556. The Court noted that Indian tribes were necessarily dependent on foreign nations to
prevent intrusions into their territory, and thus, the relationship between the United States and the
tribes was “that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful[,] not that
of individuals abandoning their national character.” Id. at 555.
52 U.S. (11 How.) 362 (1850).
Id. at 374.
Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal
Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 619 (2010) (citing Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358
(1919)).
See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) (“Indian Nations are exempt
from suit without Congressional authorization.”).
Wood, supra note 47, at 1653 (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512–13).
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2031 (2014) (quoting C & L Enters., Inc. v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001)).
See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (stating that Indian tribes
did not surrender the immunity when the Constitution was adopted because the tribes were not
present at the Constitutional Convention and cannot be bound by “a convention to which they
were not even parties.”); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (recognizing that
Indian tribes have common-law immunity from suit, though it is subject to abrogation by Congress).
523 U.S. 751 (1998); Struve, supra note 6, at 153.
Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 756, 758. Scholars contend that the Court in Kiowa mischaracterized the tribal
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sovereign immunity and foreign sovereign immunity, noting that foreign
sovereign immunity was initially a judicial doctrine, which Congress limited
and defined in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to provide more
predictable rules.65 The Court’s criticism of tribal sovereign immunity in
Kiowa, as William Wood argues, generally undermined the legitimacy of the
doctrine itself.66 As a result, the lower federal courts and the state courts have
followed suit, carving out exceptions in some cases, despite the Court’s
statement that immunity applies unless Congress has abrogated immunity or
unless the tribe has waived immunity.67
C. State Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Sovereign Immunity Compared
Tribal sovereign immunity bears resemblance to the state sovereign
immunity doctrine in important ways. While tribal sovereign immunity
arises out of the concerns that are more similar to those of foreign sovereign
immunity, and is similarly a judicial creation,68 it bears resemblance to state
sovereign immunity in the breadth of the doctrine and the Court’s
formulations of rules for abrogation.
One of the most notable aspects of state sovereign immunity is its
connection to the Constitution, both in the grant of state sovereign immunity
found in the Eleventh Amendment and the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Court’s abrogation doctrine. The Court has therefore
used the Constitution to significantly limit the instances when state sovereign

65
66
67

68

sovereign immunity doctrine as developing by accident. See Wood, supra note 47, at 1657 (“[T]he
Court’s characterizations of the doctrine, and especially its history are incorrect. The above analysis
makes it abundantly clear that the doctrine did not develop by accident.”); Struve, supra note 6, at
154 (“The Kiowa Court was inaccurate in assuming that Turner provides the earliest Supreme Court
reference to principles of tribal sovereign immunity . . . .”).
Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 759.
Wood, supra note 47, at 1598.
Id. at 1599; see, e.g., TTEA v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676, 680–81 (5th Cir. 1999)
(distinguishing Kiowa as an action for damages and holding that tribal doctrine immunity does not
support a dismissal of actions for declaratory or injunctive relief).
Foreign sovereign immunity does not have a basis in the Constitution, like state sovereign
immunity, but arises out of international common law principles. Andrea M. Seielstad, The
Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative
Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 675 (2002).
Foreign sovereign immunity rested primarily on deference to the political branches of government
through the twentieth century, changing with the policies of the State Department. See Verlinden
B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (“[T]his Court consistently has deferred
to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on whether
to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.”); Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588–89 (1943) (recognizing the Court’s duty to defer to the State
Department in order to maintain relations with foreign powers). Congress eventually codified
foreign sovereign immunity. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-583,
90 Stat. 2892 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2012)).
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immunity may be abrogated.69 Tribal sovereign immunity is not based in
the Constitution, but is a judicial creation.70 As a result, the limitations on
tribal sovereign immunity are slightly different than those of state sovereign
immunity. Tribal sovereign immunity, though subject to abrogation by
Congress like state sovereign immunity, does not face the same constitutional
limits as state sovereign immunity; valid congressional abrogation of tribal
immunity is not limited to uses of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power.
The consequence of this difference is that while there are many instances
where sovereign immunity might apply regardless of if a party is a state or a
tribe, there are many other scenarios when only states might be able to assert
immunity.71
Another distinction between state and tribal sovereign immunity is the
justification the Court espouses when discussing them. The Court often
points to the dignity of the states when discussing state sovereign immunity.72
While the Court sometimes justifies tribal sovereign immunity with
arguments about preserving their dignity, such arguments are rarely made.73
It is far more common for the Court to point to self-sufficiency and economic
development as justifications of tribal sovereign immunity.74 While the
69

70

71

72

73

74

See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636–37 (1999)
(determining that Congress could only validly abrogate state sovereign immunity using its
Fourteenth Amendment powers); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment restricted the Court’s use of Article III power over states
and that Congressional power under Article I could not be used to avoid such constitutional
restrictions).
See Seielstad, supra note 68, at 675 (“[T]he federal judiciary and Congress have also recognized the
doctrine of sovereign immunity with respect to . . . American Indian tribes. Tribes . . . however,
are not part of the constitutional design . . . .”).
For example, while Congress was unable to abrogate state immunity in the Patent Remedy Act,
the same abrogation of tribal immunity would likely be considered valid. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at
630 (holding that Congress had not successfully abrogated state sovereign immunity through the
Patent Remedy Act).
See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (“The preeminent
purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status
as sovereign entities.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (stating that the federal system
preserves the sovereignty of the states by reserving them their dignity and through concurrent
authority over people with the federal government).; see also Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity
in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003) (arguing that the Court has increasingly
relied on the dignitary interests of the states to justify expanding the state sovereign immunity
doctrine). Peter Smith notes that the current Court did not create the dignity rationale, but did
choose to revive it, making the rationale increasingly central to the reasoning of its decisions. Id. at
24. Smith further asserts that the Court’s recent use of the term “state dignity” has little relation to
its historic meaning derived from the law of nations that was used to initially develop foreign
sovereign immunity doctrine. Id. at 107.
But see Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2042 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (determining that tribes and states cannot sue each other because allowing such suits
would “fail to respect the dignity of Indian Tribes”).
See Okla. Tax. Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 510
(1991) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987))
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Court seems to use the language of “state dignity” less in its justifications of
tribal, it does not make sense to limit it in that way. The idea of “state
dignity” first developed in relation to foreign states and the law of nations.75
Given that the Court has considered tribes to be quasi-sovereign nations that
are foreign to the federal and state governments of the United States,76 it
seems that the Court in some ways considers tribes to be like foreign nations.
In comparing the tribes to the states and to foreign nations, it is odd for the
Court to discuss the states’ immunity in terms of “state dignity” but not the
immunity of tribes as such. The states and tribes are both subordinate to the
federal government in some ways, and yet the tribes, in other ways, have
more independence from the federal government, operating for some
functions in ways more similar to foreign nations.77 This is all to say that
while the Court seems to justify doctrines of sovereign immunity in different
ways, the distinctions between the justification of the doctrines do not present
a bright line and the justifications should apply across immunity doctrines.
II. PATENT VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS
Before examining the way that the PTO has applied state and tribal
immunity, this Part will briefly discuss patent validity and infringement
claims and how they are adjudicated at the PTO.
A. Traditional Avenues for Asserting Patent Validity and Infringement
Before the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was passed in 2011, patent
rights were asserted primarily in the federal district courts. This is because
Congress has explicitly stated that the district courts have original jurisdiction
over civil actions relating to patents and that no state court has jurisdiction
over claims relating to patents.78 Patent cases typically require a patentee to
sue alleging that someone has infringed her patent. In these cases, the alleged
infringer will usually assert a defense of noninfringement or invalidity.79
However, declaratory relief is also sometimes available; an alleged infringer

75
76
77

78
79

(identifying Congress’s failure to abrogate tribal immunity as promoting Indian self-government,
including self-sufficiency and economic development). But see Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (expressing concern that immunity may have detrimental economic
effects for parties unfamiliar with tribal immunity, particularly in tort cases).
Smith, supra note 72, at 28–29.
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978).
Tribes often have their own courts and are financially independent of the United States
government. See Kirke Kickingbird, Striving for the Independence of Native American Tribal Courts, 36
HUM. RTS., Winter 2009, at 16, 16–17 (describing tribal governance structure).
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012).
35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012).
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may seek a declaratory judgement that a patent is invalid.80 In order to
invoke a declaratory judgement, though, the alleged infringer must show
there is an actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgement Act.81
Additionally, Congress has created a special scheme for resolving patent
disputes that involve generic drugs that infringe patents of existing drugs.82
In a patent case in the district court, there is a rebuttable presumption
that the patent asserted is valid.83 As a result, a party asserting invalidity has
the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.84
Furthermore, when asserting that a patent is invalid, the alleged infringer
may do so on the basis of any ground specified in §§ 101–103 or claim that
the patent fails to comply with the requirements of § 112.85 These grounds
include lack patentable subject matter (§ 101), lack of novelty, also called
anticipation (§ 102), obviousness (§ 103), and lack of written description or
enablement (§ 112).
B. Inter Partes Review
Congress created inter partes review (“IPR”) as an alternative to federal
court litigation of patent invalidity in 2011 as part of the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act. Though the initial process of obtaining a patent
provides no opportunity for third parties to challenge its validity, IPRs allow
for any person who is not the patent owner to challenge the patent.86 Nine
months after a patent is issued, anyone may petition the PTO to institute an
IPR of the patent to cancel one or more of the patent claims.87 The grounds
on which a patent may be challenged in an IPR are more limited than in a
district court proceeding; in an IPR, the patent may only be challenged for
anticipation (§ 102) or obviousness (§ 103).88
Once the PTO has been petitioned for an IPR, the Director of the PTO
must authorize the IPR to be instituted. The petitioner must demonstrate
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner will prevail on at least

80
81
82
83
84
85

86
87
88

CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 766 (4th ed. 2017).
28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012); NARD, supra note 80, at 766.
For a detailed explanation of this scheme, see generally ANDA LITIGATION: STRATEGIES AND
TACTICS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LITIGATORS (Kenneth L. Dorsney ed., 2d ed. 2016).
35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
See Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011) (holding that § 282 of the Patent Act
requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
35 U.S.C. § 282(b). One of the § 112 requirements is excepted from the available defenses: a patent
may not be declared invalid, and thus cancelled, for failure to disclose a best mode, though failure
to disclose a best mode may be grounds for denial of an application at the PTO. Id.;
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012); NARD, supra note 80, at 41–42.
35 U.S.C. § 311(c)(1).
35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
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one of the claims challenged by the petition.89 Decisions on whether to
institute an IPR are final and nonappealable, though a party may request a
rehearing on the decision.90 Once instituted, a decision on validity may be
appealed to the Federal Circuit.91
If an IPR is instituted, the petitioner must prove to the PTAB that the
patent claims are invalid by a preponderance of the evidence.92 This is a
much lower burden of proof than the standard applied by the federal courts,
which require invalidity to be proved by clear and convincing evidence due
to the presumption of validity that the courts give to patents that have been
granted by the PTO.93 IPR proceedings also differ from the proceedings in
the federal courts in their discovery procedures, and previously their claim
construction procedures.94 Once a final decision has been reached on the
patent’s validity, the petitioner may not file a new IPR regarding any
challenged patent claims that were raised or could have been raised during
the review.95 The petitioner also may not assert that such a claim is invalid
in a district court or International Trade Commission action.96 Essentially,
the decision of the PTAB precludes the same parties from litigating invalidity
on those claims in any other forum.97
Since IPRs were first held in September 2012 to the end of 2017, over
7,000 IPR petitions have been filed.98 Of those proceedings, approximately
89
90
91
92
93

94

95

96
97
98

35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
37 C.F.R. § 42.71(c)-(d) (2015).
35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 319.
37 C.F.R. § 42.1(d) (2015).
Adriana L. Burgy, Five Considerations Before Filing an IPR, FINNEGAN: AIA BLOG (May 1, 2013),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/america-invents-act/five-considerations-beforefiling-an-ipr.html.
Until recently, in IPR proceedings, claims were “given [their] broadest reasonable construction in
light of the specification of the patent in which [they] appear,” while district courts construed the
claims more narrowly, sometimes consulting extrinsic evidence to construe the claim. Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b). A party in an IPR may also request that the PTAB
construes the claims according to the district court approach if they certify that the patent will expire
within eighteen months of the filing date of the petition. 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b). While courts may
consider extrinsic evidence in claim construction, the Federal Circuit held in Phillips that intrinsic
evidence, such as the patent specification, should be given more weight in claim construction than
extrinsic evidence, like dictionaries. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323–24. However, on October 11, 2018
the PTO passed a final rule that changed its claim construction standard to comport with the claim
construction that would be conducted in a federal court under the America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C.
§ 282(b). 83 Fed. Reg. 51,342 (October 11, 2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
America Invents Act (AIA) Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Aug. 14,
2014, 12:26 AM), https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-regulations/america-invents-actaia/america-invents-act-aia-frequently-asked#3242 (last modified Aug. 5, 2016, 11:17 PM).
Id.
The petitioner may still appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit, and the decision would have the
same preclusive effects. 35 U.S.C. §§ 319, 329.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM 3 (2017),
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twenty-four percent resulted in a final written decision, and about eighty-one
percent of those written decisions found that some or all claims at issue in the
proceeding were unpatentable.99 Given the high percentage of claim
invalidation, patent owners have sought ways to immunize themselves from
IPR. For example, the Supreme Court recently considered a challenge to
IPR that asserted that such proceedings were unconstitutional,100 as well as
a challenge regarding whether the PTAB could institute some challenged
claims but not others in an IPR.101
III. APPLICATIONS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN PATENT CASES AND
INTER PARTES REVIEW
Sovereign immunity arguments to prevent suits for patent invalidity and
infringement are relatively new. As a result, some sovereign immunity
doctrines have only recently been applied by courts to patent cases. This
Part will examine recent cases that have applied sovereign immunity in
patent cases (both in federal courts and in adjudications by the PTO), and
inconsistencies between those decisions that ought to be resolved.
A. State Sovereign Immunity in Patent Cases
State sovereign immunity has been asserted in patent cases far more than
tribal sovereign immunity. As Florida Prepaid held, Congress’s attempt to
abrogate state immunity for patent cases was unsuccessful, since Congress
did not utilize a constitutional provision that could validly support
abrogation.102 As a result, states have asserted their sovereign immunity in
subsequent cases to avoid liability for patent infringement and other patentrelated issues. For example, in one case, a state asserted its immunity in an
action seeking to correct the inventorship of a patent.103 In Ali v. Carnegie
Institution of Washington, a graduate student sued both a private institute and
the University of Massachusetts, which as a state university, asserted state
sovereign immunity.104 The Federal Circuit held that the University of
Massachusetts was immune from the suit, since the state never waived its
immunity, and therefore found that the suit had to be dismissed under Rule

99
100
101
102
103
104

https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_Statistics_2017-12-31.pdf.
Id. at 11.
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1372 (2018)
(analyzing whether IPR violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment).
SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1352–53 (2018) (holding that the PTAB must issue a final
decision regarding the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner).
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639–40, 642
(1999).
Ali v. Carnegie Inst. of Wash., 684 F. App’x 985 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curium).
Id. at 986–87, 992.
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19(b).105
State sovereign immunity has also been asserted in administrative
proceedings in front of the PTO. In Vas-Cath,106 the University of Missouri
initiated an interference proceeding107 under 35 U.S.C. § 135 at the PTO to
determine whether their patent or that of Vas-Cath had priority.108 The
University of Missouri did not assert its immunity at the PTO, nor could it,
given that by initiating the interference, the University clearly consented to
the proceeding. However, after the PTO granted the University priority,
Vas-Cath appealed the decision to the district courts.109 At that point, the
University asserted its Eleventh Amendment immunity.110 As the Federal
Circuit considered whether the University of Missouri waived its sovereign
immunity, it looked to Lapides, as well as its own precedent.111 Although the
Federal Circuit found that interference proceedings had strong similarities to
civil litigation, so under Federal Maritime Commission state immunity would
apply, it ultimately determined that because the University requested the
interference, it had waived its immunity.112
The PTO has also considered questions of state sovereign immunity in
IPR proceedings. In Covidien,113 after an IPR was instituted by the PTO, the
University of Florida filed a motion to dismiss based on its sovereign
immunity.114 First, the PTAB considered whether Federal Maritime Commission
should apply in IPR proceedings.115 In doing so, the PTAB addressed
arguments by the petitioner that Federal Maritime Commission should not apply
because IPRs are directed at the patent itself, not the parties to the
proceeding and because traditional remedies of injunctive relief and damages
105
106
107

108
109

110
111

112
113
114
115

Id. at 992–994; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Interference proceedings were administrative adjudications used to determine if a patent
application should have priority over another patent or application within the meaning of
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) before the America Invents Act was passed. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2301 (9th ed. 2017). Since the America Invents Act changed the United States to a
first to file system, interference proceedings and priority contests do not apply to patents filed after
the effective date of the America Invents Act.
Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1378.
Id. at 1379. The case was initially appealed to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.
Id.
It was transferred to the Western District of Missouri pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) on a motion by the University. Id.
Id.
Id. at 1381–82 (citing Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002); then
citing Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that
when a state files a suit, thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it waives its immunity
not just for its own claim, but also ay compulsory counterclaims that arose out of the same conduct)).
Id. at 1382–83 (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)).
Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc., IPR2016-01274, IPR2016-01275, IPR201601276, 2017 WL 4015009 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5.
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are unavailable in IPRs.116 However, the PTAB determined that both of
these arguments were without merit.117 The PTAB first observed that “inter
partes” translates to “between the parties,” and further determined that
because the patent owner had to be served with the petition, the proceeding
was directed toward the parties themselves, not just the patent.118
Additionally, the PTAB noted that sovereign immunity applied regardless of
the relief a plaintiff (or petitioner) sought; the fact that the only remedy
available in an IPR proceeding was cancellation of the patent was not a bar
to sovereign immunity being asserted.119
After determining that Federal Maritime Commission should be applied, the
PTAB considered the similarities between civil litigation and the proceedings
in an IPR.120 In particular, the PTAB identified discovery, an ability to
submit additional briefing, and the similarities between Article III judges and
the administrative patent judges that preside over IPRs as making IPRs
similar to civil litigation.121 The PTAB also recognized that its ruling in this
case would mean that all state entities would be able to claim Eleventh
Amendment immunity from IPR proceedings, but the PTAB believed that
the decision was consistent with the goals of state sovereign immunity in
maintaining the dignity of the states.122
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Patent Cases
Similar to state sovereign immunity, tribal sovereign immunity has been
asserted in patent cases. In a few cases, tribes have successfully asserted a
defense of tribal immunity in patent infringement cases.123 Congress has not
abrogated tribal sovereign immunity in patent cases, so the courts are
hesitant to find that tribal immunity should not apply in such cases.124 More

116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

124

Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 765 (2002)).
Id. at *8.
Id. at *9–10.
Id. at *11.
See Microlog Corp. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. 6:10-CV-260, 2011 WL 13141413, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
Jul. 22, 2011) (“The Patent Act, though authorizing civil actions for infringement, does not
unequivocally abrogate an Indian Tribe’s immunity from suit for patent infringement.”); Specialty
House of Creation, Inc. v. Quapaw Tribe, No. 10-CV-371-GKF-TLW, 2011 WL 308903, at *1
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2011) (holding that a tribe could claim sovereign immunity in a patent
infringement case because Congress did not expressly abrogate immunity); cf. Bassett v.
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that a tribe could claim
immunity from a copyright infringement suit).
Congress’s attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Patent Remedy Act did not also
attempt to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, though it is possible that Congress could take such
action in the future.

Dec. 2018] IMMUNITY INCONSISTENCY AT THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

629

recently, the Eastern District of Texas encountered an assertion of tribal
sovereign immunity when defendants in a patent infringement case counter
claimed that the patents in question were invalid.125 In an effort to avoid
having its patents invalidated, plaintiff Allergan assigned its patents to the
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, joined the tribe to the suit in the district court,
and the tribe asserted its immunity.126 The district court, however, decided
that the tribe’s immunity was not applicable.127 Since the case was initially
brought by Allergan, and the patent interest was transferred during the
course of the litigation, the court found that the action could be continued
against Allergan.128 As a result, the district court subsequently invalidated
Allergan’s six patents.129
Turning to tribal immunity in administrative proceedings, it is first
important to note that the Supreme Court has not determined whether tribal
immunity could apply in an adjudicative proceeding at an administrative
agency. The Ninth Circuit observed that tribal immunity is generally not
asserted in administrative proceedings because tribes are not able to use their
immunity to prevent the federal government from exercising its
obligations.130 Furthermore, the court in that case held that “tribal
sovereignty does not extend to prevent the federal government from
exercising its superior sovereign powers.”131 While the Ninth Circuit held
that the tribe’s immunity did not extend to a federal administrative
proceeding, the court also determined that the tribe’s voluntary participation
in that hearing did not waive its immunity in an action seeking review of the
125
126

127
128

129

130
131

Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
Adam Davidson, Why is Allergan Partnering with the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 20,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/11/20/why-is-allergan-partnering-with-thest-regis-mohawk-tribe; Jonathan D. Rockoff, Patents Take Refuge With Indian Tribe, WALL ST. J., Sep.
9, 2017, at B.1; see also Plaintiff’s Production of Documents in Response to Court’s October 6, 2017
Order at 510-1, Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01455-WCB (E.D. Tex. Oct.
10, 217) (transferring ownership of patents from Allergan to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe).
Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at * 4.
Id. at *4–5. The court further noted that its decision to order the tribe to be joined in the suit had
no bearing on the validity of the patents or the assignment of those patents. Id. at *5. The court
additionally expressed misgivings about the validity of the transfer before stating that it will join the
tribe as a plaintiff to avoid any challenge on that ground. Id.
Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4803941, at *65
(E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017). The case is currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit. See Allergan,
Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 18-1130 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017).
Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. It should be noted that Quileute Indian Tribe involves an administrative proceeding in front of the
Interior Board of Indian Appeals, which has jurisdiction over appeals involving Indian matters.
About the Interior Board of Indian Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
https://www.doi.gov/oha/organization/ibia (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). What the Ninth Circuit
terms as superior sovereign powers likely do not relate to all administrative agencies of the federal
government, but instead likely apply to those that exercise direct control over Indian affairs.
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administrative decision.132
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion and reasoning was considered in a recent
IPR case that addressed tribal immunity in PTO proceedings.133 The
defendants in Allergan’s Eastern District of Texas case filed petitions for IPRs
on the same six patents at issue in the district court, before a decision was
rendered in that case.134 Once again, the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe asserted
its tribal immunity in an effort to stop the invalidation of the patents.135
Unlike the district court, which did not discuss whether tribal sovereign
immunity should apply, the PTAB fully examined whether or not tribal
immunity should apply in IPR proceedings. First, the PTAB noted that,
unlike for state sovereign immunity, there was no federal court precedent
that suggested that Federal Maritime Commission should apply not just to state
sovereign immunity, but also to tribal immunity in federal administrative
proceedings.136 The PTAB additionally refused to follow the example of
other agencies that have chosen to recognize tribal sovereign immunity in
adjudications,137 and noting that tribal immunity does not always follow the
same contours of state immunity.138 The Board further noted that its own
precedent “cautions against the application of non-statutory defenses in inter
partes review proceedings.”139
The Board in Mylan then considered the nature of IPR proceedings to
determine whether tribal immunity should apply. First, the Board asserted
that IPR proceedings were not just a forum for dispute resolutions, but were
directed towards the patent and its validity.140 Furthermore, the PTAB
asserted that a patent owner is not required to participate in an IPR
proceeding, and the PTAB is able to make determinations on the validity of
the patent regardless of if the patent owner chooses to participate.141 The
Board also found that IPR proceedings were not the type of suit that Native
American tribes would enjoy immunity from because the Board does not
132
133
134
135

136
137

138
139
140
141

Quileute Indian Tribe, 18 F.3d at 1460.
Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-00127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *5
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam).
Decision of Inst. of Inter Partes Review, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., IPR2016-01127
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 8, 2016)
Patent Owner’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Based on Tribal Sovereign Immunity,
Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., IPR2016-01127 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 22, 2017), available at
https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/ptab-filings%2FIPR2016-01127%2F78.
Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *3.
Id.; see, e.g., Kanj v. Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians, No. 06-074, 2007 WL 1266963, at *2–3
(Dep’t of Labor Adm. Rev. Bd. Apr. 27 2007) (holding that existing sovereign immunity doctrine
did not preclude sovereign immunity in administrative adjudications).
Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *5 (quoting Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbit, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
Id. at *4.
Id. at *4, *6.
Id. at *6.
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adjudicate claims in which any relief may be sought from the tribe.142 The
PTAB is only able to hold a patent invalid and cancel it, but it is not able to
restrain a patent holder from acting or compel monetary damages, both of
which could be available remedies in a federal court proceeding.143
The Federal Circuit heard the same case on appeal from the PTAB,
affirming the decision.144 However, unlike the PTAB, the Federal Circuit
did not consider whether or not Federal Maritime Commission ought to apply to
tribal immunity in administrative adjudications; rather the Federal Circuit
applied Federal Maritime Commission, merely stating that while tribal immunity
and state immunity were not the same, the case was nonetheless instructive
for their analysis.145 The Federal Circuit then affirmed the PTAB’s decision
by finding that IPRs were not sufficiently similar to civil litigation due to the
PTO Director’s discretion at the outset of IPR proceedings, the ability of the
PTO to continue proceedings without the parties, and the fact that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in IPR proceedings.146
C. The PTAB’s Inconsistent Reasoning
In its decision in Mylan, the PTAB directly contradicts its own prior
reasoning and assertions from Covidien, despite the two cases being decided
less than a year apart. First, the Board changed its position regarding
whether IPR proceedings were directed towards the patent or the parties
between the two cases. While in Covidien the Board made clear that the
proceedings were directed towards the parties,147 in Mylan, the Board asserts
that the proceedings are directed at the patent, intending to correct the
PTO’s own mistakes in granting invalid patents.148 Additionally, in Mylan,
the Board found that since IPR proceedings did not provide ordinary
injunctive relief or damages, they were not the type of suit in which immunity
could be asserted.149 Conversely, in Covidien, the Board noted that sovereign
immunity applied regardless of the relief sought.150 Furthermore, the Board
noted that its precedent warns against applying non-statutory defenses in IPR
proceedings as justification for not allowing a defense of sovereign immunity
in Mylan, while allowing state sovereign immunity as a defense in Covidien.151
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id.
Id.
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1327–28.
See supra text accompanying notes 116–18.
Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4.
See supra text accompanying notes 142–43.
See supra text accompanying note 119.
See Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4 (“Board precedent cautions against the application of nonstatutory defenses in inter partes review proceedings.” (citing Athena Automation Ltd. v. Husky
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The PTAB attempts to explain these differences by asserting that patents
are governed by a statute of general applicability.152 While the Supreme
Court has found that general statutes apply to all persons, including Native
Americans and their property interests,153 it is unclear whether that includes
only individuals or also the tribes as a whole, and the circuits are split on how
they apply that law.154 Furthermore, when applying patent and copyright
laws, both of which are laws of general applicability stemming from the same
clause of the Constitution,155 the federal courts have typically allowed tribes
to assert their sovereign immunity.156
The Board further argues that tribal immunity and state immunity are
not co-extensive.157 While the Board is correct that tribal immunity is not
always co-extensive with state immunity,158 in the context of patents, tribes
have been able to assert their immunity just as states are able to assert their
immunity. Beyond just patents, the Supreme Court’s precedent contains
analogs between state and tribal sovereign immunity that suggest Federal

152
153

154

155
156

157

158

Injection Molding Sys. Ltd., No. IPR2013–00290, 2013 WL 8595976, at *6–7 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25,
2013))). The PTAB argues that unlike the statute creating International Trade Commission patent
proceedings, the statute creating IPR proceedings does not explicitly allow all legal and equitable
defenses. Id.
Id.
See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) (“[I]t is now well
settled by many decisions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying to all persons
includes Indians and their property interests.”). In Tuscarora Indian Nation, the Court determined
that the Federal Power Act applied to Indian nations because it specifically included “‘tribal lands
embraced within Indian reservations.’” Id. at 118 (citation omitted). However, the patent statute,
while it includes states in its definition of “whoever,” does not explicitly include tribes. See
35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (2012).
See Eagle H. Robinson, Comment, Infringing Sovereignty: Should Federal Courts Protect Patents and
Copyrights from Tribal Infringement?, 32 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 233, 242, 244 (2007) (“It is thus difficult
to argue that the Court [in Tuscarora] did not intend the language to implicate the coffers of tribes
as well as individuals.”).
Copyright and patent law are grounded in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See Basset v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a tribe
was immune from a suit asserting copyright infringement); Home Bingo Network v. Multimedia
Games, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-0608, 2005 WL 2098056, at *1–2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (granting
a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the defendant tribe was immune from a patent infringement
action). But see Robinson, supra note 154, at 248 (criticizing federal courts for allowing tribal
immunity for patent and copyright cases despite the fact that Congress “created a system of
intellectual property rights and protections and has made clear through several clarification acts that
it is to apply uniformly to all.”).
See Mylan, WL 1100950, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam) (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla.
v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998)) (recognizing precedent finding Indian tribes’
immunity to be nonconcurrent from the States’).
See Kiowa, 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998) (“[T]he immunity possessed by Indian Tribes is not coextensive
with that of the States.”); Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476
U.S. 877, 890 (1986) (“[B]ecause of the peculiar ‘quasi-sovereign’ status of the Indian tribes, the
Tribe’s immunity is not congruent with that which the Federal Government, or the States, enjoy.”
(citing United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940))).
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Maritime Commission should be extended to allow tribal immunity in
administrative adjudications. The Court in Federal Maritime Commission
examines the nature of the states’ sovereign immunity, concluding that the
states ratified the Constitution “with their sovereignty intact.”159 The Court’s
reasoning in Blatchford suggests that the same might be said of tribal
sovereignty, as the Court noted that the tribes could not have surrendered
their sovereignty in a convention that they were not even parties to.160
Next, the Federal Maritime Commission Court notes that the Eleventh
Amendment does not define the full scope of state sovereign immunity, and
therefore concludes that the full scope of state immunity is not described in
the Constitution.161 The consequence of this is that the Court is willing to
find immunity in instances that could not have been imagined or anticipated
by the Framers of the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment, including
the administrative state.162 Therefore, the Court turns to the question of
whether administrative proceedings are the type that the Framers would
have thought the states would be immune to.163 The Court has similarly
declined to define the full scope of tribal sovereign immunity, even refusing
to limit immunity to activities on Indian reservations.164 The Court, rather,
maintains that as a matter of federal law, “an Indian tribe is subject to suit
only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its
immunity.”165 Much like how the Federal Maritime Commission Court was faced
with the question of whether administrative proceedings are the type of
proceeding that the Framers imagined states would have immunity from,166
the question here is whether an administrative proceeding is a suit. A suit is
defined as “[a]ny proceeding by a party or parties against another in a court
of law.”167 Further, a court of law is considered any judicial tribunal
administering laws, and is not limited to just an Article III court.168 Given
this understanding of suit, the term could encompass tribunals and
adjudications of administrative agencies.
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Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991).
Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 753.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 755.
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754–55 (1998).
Id. at 754.
Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 756.
Suit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[S]uit refers to an ongoing dispute at any stage,
from the initial filing to the ultimate resolution. Lawsuit more clearly implies courtroom proceedings
before a judge as opposed to a dispute before some other type of tribunal.” (citing BRYAN A.
GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 862–63 (3d ed. 2011))).
Court of law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Finally, the Federal Maritime Commission Court considered Seminole Tribe
and its holding that Congress cannot use its Article I power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in Article III courts.169 Extending its Seminole Tribe
holding, the Court concluded that Congress may not use its Article I powers
to create non-Article III tribunals that closely resemble federal courts where
state sovereign immunity does not apply.170 In tribal immunity doctrine, the
same limits are not placed on Congressional abrogation of immunity. As a
result, the Court would likely allow Congress to abrogate tribal sovereign
immunity in an administrative proceeding. However, that abrogation would
have to be explicit and clear, as the law requires for any abrogation of tribal
sovereign immunity.171
The Federal Circuit could potentially also engage in inconsistent
reasoning based on its decision in Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. The Federal Circuit in that case noted that its opinion
should be read narrowly as only deciding whether tribal immunity should
apply to IPR proceedings.172 However, the opinion uses the doctrine
established in Federal Maritime Commission, state sovereign immunity doctrine,
to decide the case.173 Since the Federal Circuit essentially imported state
immunity doctrine into tribal immunity, and ultimately decided tribal
immunity should not apply, the court has set itself up to find that state
immunity should not apply in IPR proceedings either. Should the Federal
Circuit in the future find that state immunity does apply, the Federal Circuit
would, like the PTO, be using reasoning that was contradictory to and
inconsistent with its prior precedents.
IV. POLICY UNDERPINNINGS OF TRIBAL IMMUNITY IN IPRS AND OTHER
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONS
While the Board’s reasoning in Mylan was inconsistent with both its prior
decisions in state immunity cases and with federal court decisions in tribal
immunity cases, there are clear policy rationales for why the Board
determined the tribe should not be allowed to assert its immunity. Mylan
presents facts that are particularly troublesome because they demonstrate a
pharmaceutical company’s attempt to circumvent the patent system.
169
170
171
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173

Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 761.
Id.
Congress’s attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Patent Remedy Act did not also
attempt to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity, though it is possible that Congress could take such
action in the future. For example, a bill was introduced in the Senate to abrogate tribal immunity
in IPR proceedings. S. 1948, 115th Cong. (2017).
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
See id. at 1326 (“Although the precise contours of tribal sovereign immunity differ from those of
state sovereign immunity, the FMC analysis is instructive.”).
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Allergan, the original patent holder in Mylan and in the Eastern District of
Texas’s Allergan case, sold its patent to the Saint Regis Mohawk tribe just after
the hearing at the district court and just before the IPR hearing was to take
place.174 As Judge Bryson noted in his opinion in Allergan, “Allergan purports
to have sold the patents to the Tribe, but in reality it has paid the tribe to
allow Allergan to purchase—or perhaps more precisely, to rent—the Tribe’s
sovereign immunity in order to defeat the pending IPR proceedings in the
PTO.”175 Judge Bryson expressed serious concern over the legitimacy of that
tactic, as have other commentators.176 And they are right to do so. Allergan’s
assignment of the patents is structured such that the Tribe paid nothing to
take ownership of the patents, and instead is being paid millions of dollars to
buy the patents and millions more in annual royalties from licensing the
patents back to Allergan.177 The deal essentially looks, as Judge Bryson says,
as if Allergan is merely renting the tribe’s immunity to avoid invalidation of
their patents.178
It is also possible that Allergan’s case might be considered a broader
cautionary tale. Allergan is the most recently publicized example where a
private entity has attempted to avoid its legal obligations by effectively
borrowing a tribe’s sovereign immunity. But there are likely other instances
where a party in a suit or administrative adjudication might seek to transfer
assets to a tribe or otherwise utilize a tribe’s immunity to avoid liability and
legal obligations. Tribal corporations are typically exempt from suit, and
another private entity could seek to create a subsidiary that was a tribal
corporation in order to take advantage sovereign immunity in any number
of types of cases.179
However, determining that a tribe can never assert its immunity in a
patent case or IPR proceeding may be going too far. Allergan’s deal with
the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe has provided one example where a tribe
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Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1445-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
Id. at *2.
Id.; see, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Allergan: Creating Sovereign Immunity with Tribal Pass-Through, PATENTLYO (Sept. 8, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/09/allergan-creating-sovereign.html
(asserting that Allergan’s transaction with the tribe might be considered a sham); Derek Lowe,
Allergan Pulls a Fast One, SCIENCE TRANSLATIONAL MEDICINE: IN THE PIPELINE (Sept. 11, 2017),
http://blogs.sciencemag.org/pipeline/archives/2017/09/11/allergan-pulls-a-fast-one (arguing
that Allergan’s actions seriously undermine the patent system and the framework for
pharmaceutical patent litigation).
Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Brian L. Pierson, The Precarious Sovereign Immunity of Tribal Business Corporations, FED. LAW., Apr. 2015,
at 58, 59 (Apr. 2015), available at http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Federal-LawyerMagazine/2015/April/Features/The-Precarious-Sovereign-Immunity-of-Tribal-BusinessCorporations.aspx?FT=.pdf.
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might want to assert its immunity in a patent case, but it is not the only
reason. A tribe that invents and patents a machine on its own might also
want to assert its immunity, in a fashion similar to that of state universities
that generate patented inventions as a result of their research. Under the
PTAB’s Mylan decision, though, such tribes are precluded from asserting that
immunity.180 In essence, Allergan’s transfer of patents to the Mohawk Tribe
has poisoned the well for any other tribes that may obtain patents in more
legitimate ways. Furthermore, Judge Bryson’s opinion, as well as portions of
the PTAB’s decision in Mylan suggest that it is possible to stop Allergan’s
attempt to prevent the invalidation of its patents without the court having to
even decide the question of whether the Mohawk Tribe is able to assert its
sovereign immunity.181 The district court found that regardless of whether
the Tribe asserted its immunity, the case could continue because the Tribe
was not a required party and because the Tribe’s predecessor in interest
sought affirmative relief.182 Likewise, in addition to considering the
applicability of tribal immunity, the PTAB also determined that Allergan was
the true owner of the patents, so the IPR could proceed without the Tribe.183
Thus, courts and the PTO (and likely other administrative agencies, too) are
able to discourage Allergan’s attempt to circumvent invalidation, even
without determining that the tribe was unable to assert its immunity in patent
and IPR proceedings, leaving sovereign immunity intact for tribes that might
seek to assert it in disputes over more legitimately obtained patents.
Additionally, there are reasons to believe that states and tribes should be
treated equally in administrative adjudications where Congress has not
abrogated tribal immunity. The Court has consistently noted the odd
position of tribes as quasi-sovereign entities.184 They are similar to states, but
did not ratify the Constitution, so they are not part of the federalist system of
the United States.185 They are foreign entities that can make treaties with
180
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Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, No. IPR2016-00127, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018) (per curiam).
Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017); Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *7.
Allergan, 2017 WL 4619790, at *4.
Mylan, 2018 WL 1100950, at *7. The PTAB relied on Federal Circuit precedent that states that a
party granted all substantial rights under the patent is considered the owner, no matter how the
transaction is characterized. Id. (quoting Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1250 (Fed.
Cir. 2000)). As the sole licensee of the patent, Allergan may assert all rights under the patent, and
thus may be considered the owner. Id. at *8.
See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71 (1978) (“[W]e have . . . recognized that
the tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations, which by government structure, culture, and source of
sovereignty are in many ways foreign to the constitutional institutions of the Federal and State
Governments.”).
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (“We have repeatedly held that
Indian tribes enjoy immunity against suits by States as it would be absurd to suggest that the tribes
surrendered immunity in a convention to which they were not even parties.” (internal citation
omitted) (citing Okla. Tax Com’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. 498 U.S. 505,
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the United States, but they exist within the borders of the United States.
They are independent entities, they rely on the United States for protection
and other benefits and Congress can abrogate their rights at any time.
However, regardless of this odd, quasi-sovereign state that tribes exist in, the
Court has been clear that tribes are able to assert their immunity unless
Congress expressly abrogates that immunity.186 That position is one that is
very similar to the position of states. A primary difference stems from
Congress’s ability to abrogate immunity in more situations for tribal
immunity than for state immunity, but in either form of immunity, absent
express abrogation, immunity is assumed.
Beyond just the doctrinal similarities of state and tribal sovereign
immunity though, tribal dignity and independence is also at stake. William
Wood has suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies has created a trend where courts are
more and more willing to disregard the Court’s assertion in the same case
that absent express abrogation, tribal immunity may be asserted.187 The
Court in that case refused to allow dignity to be a basis for upholding tribal
sovereign immunity, and all but invited Congress to abrogate tribal
immunity. Wood argues that courts have undermined tribal immunity,
slowly chipping away at the doctrine and misunderstanding the history of the
doctrine.188 As the courts seek more ways to deny tribal immunity, tribes
become more and more subordinate to the states and the federal
government, denying them of their status as sovereign entities. Allowing
immunity in administrative adjudications could be a valuable tool for
maintaining their status as sovereign entities, demonstrating that the tribes
are not fully subordinate to the states and federal government, despite how
some federal courts have pushed the doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Tribal immunity has yet to be applied extensively in administrative
adjudications, but the PTAB’s recent decision in Mylan and the Federal
Circuit’s affirmance create reason to be concerned. The PTAB’s decision
was both inconsistent with the broader doctrine of tribal immunity and with
the Board’s own precedent, but the PTAB’s decision was also a reaction to
Allergan’s attempt to avoid patent invalidation at any cost. In its effort to
curb Allergan’s circumvention of IPR proceedings, the PTAB declared that
tribal immunity should not apply in IPR proceedings. However, in order to
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509 (1991))).
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998) (“As a matter of federal law,
an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit . . . .”).
Wood, supra note 47, at 1606–07.
Id. at 1673.
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be more consistent with tribal immunity doctrine and with the closely related
doctrine of state immunity, tribal immunity should apply in administrative
adjudications, including IPR proceedings. The concerns of the PTAB that
an entity like Allergan might be trying to circumvent the IPR proceeding by
asserting tribal immunity may be dealt with in other ways, such as examining
the nature of the parties’ relationship, examining whether the tribe really has
an interest in the case, and in the case of patents specifically, questioning
which parties are able to assert the interest at stake. Tribal immunity, much
like state immunity, should apply in administrative adjudications under
Federal Maritime Commission. Not only would this put tribes on equal footing
with states, but it also recognizes that without express abrogation by
Congress, tribal immunity doctrine requires that tribes be able to assert their
immunity in such proceedings.

